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RECENT TRENDS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
Nicholas deB. Kafzenhach
Before getting into the subject of
recent trends, I want to say a few words
about some of the basic philosophical
problems of international law which I'm
sure you have discussed. I wish to make
sure that you and I are on the same
wavelength. I don't ask you to accept
my thoughts about this, but I do think
you ought to know my ideas on this
general subject so that you can understand better what I'm saying and what
I'm trying to do.
In the first place, as a professor of
international law, I was never concerned, and I am not really concerned
today, as to whether international law
does, or does not, exist as "law." I've
never seen much point in debating that
subject If I were to debate it, I would
be happy to take either side of the
question. I think it very easy to define
law in such a way as to exclude internationallaw entirely. I think it is very easy
to define law in such a way as to include
it And I think that's not a subject we
need to debate about because if I read
naval regulations correctly, CNO has
decided that question for us, since he
has told you that in certain circumstances you should abide by international law; therefore, I assume that he
believes that it exists, and that we
should assume here that it exists.
What is clear, I think, is that statesmen, very less frequently impartial
judges, sometimes national judges, and

others-including naval officers-invoke,
in justification of something that they
are doing, or in protest against something somebody else is doing, rules of
international law. The claim or assertion
that they make may be generally
accepted by others, or it may be vigorously disputed by others. The dispute
may be as to the application of a
familiar rule to a particular fact, or as to
the relevancy of another conflicting
rule. (Even in our own domestic law
system, as Justice Cardoza once noted,
rules of law generally travel in pairs and
opposites.) Or the dispute may be even
as to the rule itself, the way it is
phrased, or what it is designed to do.
If such a dispute exists I think we
can assume that very rarely will it be
decided as it would be decided within a
domestic legal system by reference to an
impartial body of judges. More likely
it's going to be decided in a particular
case by whoever has the power to make
the decision stick-whoever can make
good that claim, or make good that
protest. To the extent that the rule and
its application is not generally accepted
by others, there's going to be some
political cost involved in making the
claim, and there may be the additional
cost to the state making it, arising from
the fact that it can scarcely protest in
the future if others do the same thing.
Now nobody would contend that
that is a very satisfactory legal system,
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or even that it works very well, But I
think it would be hard to deny that
there are a number of rules of international law which are normally and customarily adhered to by states in spite of
variations and differences in formulation and application, and that these
rules do, in fact, influence decisions,
actions taken, and policies promulgated
by various states and other participants
in international political arenas. In this
limited sense, at least, the existence of
these rules, and their acceptance, does
contribute significantly to order and to
the structure of expectations within the
international community. The rules
which are most effective and most
strictly adhered to are, of course, those
in which mutual advantage is perceived
in the existence of the rule and in the
order which that rule gives. A good deal
of the law of the sea, for example,
survived for precisely this reason, and
has survived for a long time. And those
parts which are most in doubt-the
three or six or two hundred-mile limitsare those in which at least some states
have not perceived a mutual advantage
in the rule from their viewpoint.
Now the second point I would make
by way of introduction is also quite an
obvious one, and that is that any rule,
no matter how accepted, may be
breached by any state at any time. If a
state believes that the immediate advantage to it of ignoring a generally
accepted rule is greater than its interest
in the rule itself-and it can get away
with it-the rule breaks down. Usually
these are situations of crisis and I think
it's useful to remember that even in a
developed domestic legal system, rules
frequently break down in times of great
stress and crisis. To say that this is a
question of weak enforcement of international law is, I think, to beg the entire
problem.
The third introductory point that I
want to make is that any legal system is
necessarily a part of a political system.
It it unmitigated nonsense to talk, for

example, about "world law" unless
you're willing to talk about world government at the same time, because
you're not going to have a developed
legal system in the international community, as you would not in a domestic
community, unless you have a developed governmental system and political
system at the same time. The legal
system of any community is just as
developed, no more and no less, as the
political system.
The final introductory point that I
want to make is the very obvious
connection between law and policy, and
law and politics. Every rule of law,
every rule of behavior, in any society,
domestic or international, reflects a
policy; it's designed to serve a policy by
the person or people who formulate the
rule. We see this very clearly, I think, in
the domestic picture because, in fact,
most of our law is made in the Congress
and in the State Legislatures, although
at times it isn't easy to get them to
enact law.
In the international community you
don't have the kind of separation of
powers that we have in the domestic
community. You don't have a legislative
branch to enact the laws; you don't
have an executive branch to carry them
out; you don't have a judiciary to rule
with respect to disputes; and these
functions are tied together so that under
the guise of impartially applying a rule
of international law, what you may be
doing is formulating a little bit of
international policy that from the viewpoint of the person saying it, would
seem to be a sound policy for his
particular government, and perhaps for
the international community as he sees
it or would like to see it. We can,
therefore, see these rules shifting and
changing with somewhat more uncertainty, somewhat more flexibility, in
somewhat less of a developed system. It
is helpful to think of this process in
terms of efforts within international
society by these various participants to
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formulate what we would call in a more
dcveloped system a legislative policy-to
formulate rules which they believe
would usefully serve participants within
the international community. Thus any
discussion of recent trends of international law has to take account of the
changed political structure of the world
community, of the new problems, the
new political groupings, which have
come to pass in what is often a too
rapidly changing, as well as a too
dangerous world.
Most of the international law doctrine that we have-that you have been
studying-is inherited from the 19th
century. It developed throughout the
last part of the 18th century, and it
became a relatively developed system of
rules in the 19th century. To understand how that set of rules came about
and what the differences are today, and
to understand trends, we ought to look
at the political system which then prevailed and particularly its security
aspects. Fundamentally any system of
law is designed at heart to preserve
order as well as to serve other policies
within the community. It's an effort to
create an orderly way of doing things,
and an orderly way of doing things
means, at a minimum, that you remove,
as much as possible, violence or the
threat of violence. These rules developed as a system of law governing
states within the international community. They became a developed system as nation-states developed.
Now what was the security system in
which this operated and what were the
cssentials of that system? The security
system was quite obviously the balance
of power system which characterized
international society and achieved its
most developed form in the 19th century. The essentials of that system were
that you had a group primarily of
European states which were mutually
suspicious and whose best security lay
in a system of flexible alliances. That is,
the best way of preserving peace within

that system was to align yourselves with
others. If one alliance became stronger
than the other, there was a real risk of
war, and the members of the weaker
alliance could offer to a member of the
stronger alliance the necessary incentive
to move over into that alliance. A
shifting series of alliances is what I mean
by flexibility of alliance. Thus, any state
within that system had to be willing to
get up and dance with any other partner
within it. And that, I think, is essential
to understanding much of the legal
doctrine that ve have inherited.
Within the balance of power system
war was not )utlawed formally; it was
legally nobod {'s business but the state
making it. Vv e got away from earlier
concepts of rights and wrongs of war,
and simply ·jepended entirely upon this
political sy·,tem.
There '~ere other characteristics to it.
If you are going to be willing to change
partners, one of the things you can't
afford to do is get involved in ideological disputes with other countries. You
have got to take them as you find them,
if you are going to join them, or if you
may have to join them and switch from
one alliance to another. And so you
have a very strong rule in the 19th
century of noninterference in the internal affairs of other states; at least
other strong states. In fact, states were
defined in such a way as to have viable
entities that were capable of preserving
their own independence, and not becoming pawns of someone else-a
characteristic which is clearly not the
case today.
Now, in addition to that security
system there existed throughout the
European countries during the 19th
century a common ideological basis, at
least with respect to economics. You
didn't have it with respect to politics. It
was an age of revolution. But you had it
with respect to economics. There was
the dominance of laissez faire as a
philosophy shared by virtually all of the
participants. One of the conditions

118
which a state had to be able to attain to
be a "state" was to preserve enough
domestic order so that others could
trade with it and do business with it.
They had to share a variety of rules with
the more developed countries which
permitted foreign investment, at least in
the sense of foreign trading. Only if
they preserved a system of local law and
order which was sophisticated enough
to allow you to trade with them, could
they really hope to maintain their independence. Within those areas of the
world where those conditions were not
possible to achieve, trade led to a
considerable growth of colonialism inherited from an even earlier day, and
then a series of protectorates and mandates. There was very little interference
in the internal affairs of these countries
aside from maintaining sufficient order
to do business with them. And I would
remind you just briefly in passing that
the whole concept of the freedom of
the seas which I will discuss a little bit
later on, is very closely related to laissez
faire philosophy-to the economic
freedom which existed.
Now the security system began to
break down when the alliances became
less flexible toward the end of the 19th
century. I am inclined to think (I think
a lot of historians would dispute me)
that it broke down in large part because
France and Germany had to be lined up
on the opposite sides of the balance,
and Alsace may have been one of the
important reasons why it broke down.
But be that as it may, it began to lose its
flexibility-began to become impossible
to shift-and as a result we had the first
world war.
In the interwar period there took
place a series of rather vague efforts to
find some new kind of security systemtreaties, resort to courts-the Hague
Tribunal, the League of Nations, and
efforts of this kind, because the alliance
system no longer could be counted
upon. The complicated economic
system was breaking down, too.

Throughout that period there grew up a
good deal of economic nationalism,
changing somewhat the character of
war, the character of military preparedness, and certainly changing the free
economic system which had existed.
There was an effort to replace this with,
as I said, the League of Nations. It
always has seemed to me a vague response to a real problem, an effort to
create parliamentary government on an
international basis. A lot of idealism was
involved in it, and whatever its defects
nobody came up with anything very
much better. The effort, of course, of
the French and the British throughout
that period, was to recreate an alliance
system, which was probably just as
hopeless.
Let me skip World War II. What kind
of a system are we operating in today?
What kind of a political system is
in ternational law operating within
today? Clearly it is a very different
system from the 19th century system
and it's different in many important
respects. First, it is no longer exclusively
a state system, although states exist and
states are still important participants.
But what we really have today, morc
and more, are groupings of statesacting together-rather than single states
each pursuing its own individual interest.
After World War II, with the emergence of Russia as a major power, and
the emergence of the Communist Party
as a very important new element in
international politics, we faced the
effort by the Russians to dominate
other nations through the device of the
Communist Party. This technique of
disciplining people, taking over a local
government, and operating that government in conjunction with the domestic
and foreign policy of a foreign state,
was totally different from the express
forms of domination of the 19th century.
The response to the communist
threat of the West, which had no
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equivalent to the Communist Party and
no desire to dominate internal affairs of
other countries, was to create a group of
states, acting together with respect to
certain limited matters, as, for example,
NATO. Although formally set up as a
treaty arrangement of a group of separate states, actually NATO went far
beyond that in its planning, in its
attitude, and in the way in which it did
business. We did not have, and don't
have today, the complete separation of
statcs within NATO that would have
characterized the 19th century system.
There were other than military institutions that were created-other groupings of states for various limited purposes. And so there was created within
the Western world a kind of supranational authority, within limited areas
-not always strong, but viable and
continuing and existing.
In addition, there took place the
emergence of the new nations of the
world, made possible by this change in
the political structure, or at least
speeded along by this change. They have
a rather different attitude than new
states of the past. Nationalism has
served, as it has always served, its
function of being a unifying force. But
there are the problems of a colonial
heritage, some of the fears that go with
it; and coming out of that, a tendency
toward neutralism, fear of alliances,
demands for social progress, for help,
but always without interference in their
internal affairs.
And, of course, we have too, the
United Nations. Perhaps I should have
started with the United Nations, because in the League it had a predecessor
with, it seems to me, unclear ideas-or
perhaps conflicting ideas-as to what it
might do, and what it might accomplish
within the society. Whatever the aspiration and the hope, it has become clear
that there are very basic divisions within
the world, and it has become clear that
major powers can't rely upon the
United Nations as any kind of a security

system. It can serve, and does serve,
other useful functions. It does, for
example, improve communication. It
certainly has served a very useful function for the new nations who are heavily
represented, particularly in the General
Assembly, and who have an opportunity
thus to make demands and to air problems whieh would qot otherwise be
aired. But the possibility of the United
Nations taking strong and vigorous
action is limited to the relatively few
situations where the interest of major
powers, particularly the United States
and Russia, are likely either to coincide,
or, at least, not to conflict.
I suggest that the real developments
of international law are not in terms of
a universal international law with rules
equally applicable to all. More significant growth has been within these
groupings of states. We have had a
development of regionalism, and, more
importantly, of functional approaches
to shared problems.
Now some development has been
accomplished on a universal basis, but it
has become more of a pragmatic approach, less of a doctrinal one. We have,
for example, on a universal basis, not
done badly on meterological or health
problems. Within smaller functional
groupings we have, I think done quite
well.
I have already mentioned NATO in
particular; there are other alliances with
some similarity-the regional organizations such as the Organization of American States-all with some small elements
at least of supranationalism, some small
elements of acting together as an entity,
of working together to solve problems.
Far more dramatic has been the development of the Common Market. We
have something very close, with distinct
supranational characteristics, to the
creation of a new federal state within
Europe. This is a situation which would
have been wholly impossible in the 19th
century. No European state could have
afforded to create those kinds of bonds
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and ties. No state could have afforded
to have delegated to other authorities,
to supranational authorities, so much
power over its own economy, over its
own trade, and over many of the most
important functions of government. In
fact, I do not believe that any of the
members of the Common Market, had it
existed in the 19th century, could have
met the traditional international law
definition of what a state was.
Now what has this meant, this
change in the political structure, with
respect to changes in legal doctrine? The
one point I have given major emphasis
to is that we really are somewhat less
concerned today with finding universal
rules which will be applicable to all
states within the community. It seems
to me the area of progress, the area of
development, the area of excitement, is
the area which says, How do we get
together to solve a problem which is
common to all of us? And this is the
kind of activity that we have had
occasionally on a universal basis, or
close to a universal basis (I have mentioned some of the examples), and on a
military or security basis within other
groupings. It exists with respect to
economic development within still other
groupings.
There are also necessary changes as
the result of all the technology and the
change in politics. You have looked at
the laws of war. It seems to me that
there are obvious changes with respect
to the law of war. This doesn't mean it
is all to be thrown out the window. Not
all of the inherited doctrine is inapplicable in this new situation, but it has to
be adjusted to it. And I think today that
you would have far less confidence in
those areas of the inherited rules of law
with respect to warfare, particularly in
terms of protection of private property,
with respect to theft aspects, and even
more particularly with respect to laws
of neu trality (I am assuming here that
this is not an atomic war, that it's a
limited war of some kind). I think you

would have an absence-an obvious
absence-of powerful neutrals, and the
power of the neutrals which supported
the inherited doctrine up to World War I
and partly through it; rules of neutrality
are likely to go by the board in considerable measures. Some can survive.
That is, in a limited war perhaps you
can respect the territory of various
other states. I think very little of the
rights of neutrals on the high seas would
be expected to survive, and you would
have the sort of change that you already
had in World War II with respect to the
law of the sea in war.
Other doctrinal rules have changed
dramatically. We have foreign troops
today stationed on the soil of other
nations; some of our troops are abroad;
the troops of others are here and in
other countries. This was an unheard of
proposition in peacetime within a 19th
century system. And it has meant that
there is a whole body of law which has
grown up with respect to this peacetime
stationing of troops, coming in on the
invitation of a foreign government, and
various rules of conduct in respeet to
them which have grown up and which I
would expect to be developing.
There was a lot of doctrine, some of
it nonsense, about measures short of
war, and a fair amount of freedom on
the part of major powers to go into
certain parts of the world to protect
certain values which were shared bv
other states, if they could do so und~r
circumstances which gave assurance that
this was not an effort to conquer. A
good deal of that, perhaps not all of it,
has gone because of the change in the
political system.
In the law of the sea which you have
studied, I am sure you have found that
giving a forum for the first time to
nonmaritime powers with respect to
formulating rules of the sea, has led to
considerable changes in those rules. The
law of the sea was really a law created
by the United Kingdom, but quite
acceptable to all maritime powers, but

121
as we have gotten into larger multilateral arenas smaller nations have had a
voice. Whcre these have not been maritime nations, the three-mile limit faded
before a desire to monopolize fish on
the part of some small and poor countries, who for the first time have had a
voice and have used that voice (in what
I think is a mistaken way) to promote
their own interest by extending their
control as a way of subsidizing their
fishing industries.
I have already mentioned changes in
terms of the participants-that no longer
do we just have states. We have a lot of
other participants within the international community taking active roles and
governed by rules of international law.
And I take it that the problems of
communist domination have raised very
new questions for us in terms of internal
subversion, and in terms of aiding and
abetting revolution, not merely because
you didn't like the existing government,

but as a technique of foreign domination.
These, then, are the trends that I see:
More efforts to solve in groups of states
certain functional problems, continuing
with a heavy emphasis on security measures, but also including and developing
more and more efforts at economic
development, and of creating in response
to the demands of many countries better
economies, more viable governments,
and governments which are not dominated by any foreign power. I would see
these attempts at problem-solving as a
great growth of international law, less
universalism but still a great growth
among the nations marked by the growth
of institutions that don't break apart. It
is, and will be, a period of flux, of crisis,
and considerable shaking down of rulesa time of shaking them up and shaking
them down to the point that one would
sometimes doubt if they still existed. But
I would expect some survival in some
form for most of these.
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